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INTRODUCTION 
“The appendix of forms accompanying the rules illustrates how simply a claim 
may be pleaded and with how few factual averments.”1 
The Appendix of Forms that, from the time of their adoption have accom-
panied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are a seeming anachronism, more 
appropriate for a much simpler time that hardly characterizes modern day fed-
eral civil litigation. Perhaps the form for a negligence complaint is the most 
striking in this regard, offering only that at a certain time and place “the de-
fendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff,” causing harm.2 
Not only does such a complaint fail to typify the negligence claims one might 
find on any federal docket, but it also fails to reflect the much greater com-
plexity that characterizes modern litigation and life in general. 
What, then, could be the continuing point of having the forms at all? In-
deed, that is the question the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Advisory 
Committee”) has asked and answered quite recently: it has concluded that the 
Official Forms no longer serve any useful purpose3 and may therefore be dis-
carded into the waste bin of history. Seemingly without much further thought, 
the Standing Committee promptly concurred,4 as did the Judicial Conference,5 
and the U.S. Supreme Court.6 
Might it be true that the forms have outlived their usefulness? And if no 
longer of any use, were the forms ever of any real utility? On the occasion of 
the abrogation of the Official Forms, this article takes the opportunity to review 
the history and use of the forms, finding that they had more value than the cur-
rent rulemakers cared to acknowledge: The principal function of the forms was 
to reify the liberal vision of the Federal Rules and to guard against deviations 
therefrom. Unfortunately, as that liberal vision has given way to a more restric-
tive view7 in what Stephen Subrin refers to as the “fourth era” of civil proce-
                                                        
1  Sparks v. England, 113 F.2d 579, 581 (8th Cir. 1940). 
2  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
3  See Proposed Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 84, Committee Note (“The purpose of 
providing illustrations for the rules, although useful when the rules were adopted, has been 
fulfilled . . . . Accordingly, . . . Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no longer necessary. 
. . .”). 
4  Patricia W. Moore, Standing Committee Approves Proposed FRCP Amendments, CIV. 
PROC. & FED. CTS. BLOG (June 7, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2014/06 
/standing-committee-approves-proposed-frcp-amendments.html (“The Standing Committee 
met on May 29–30, 2014 in D.C. and unanimously approved the amendments as they were 
modified by the Advisory Committee at its meeting in April.”). 
5  The Judicial Conference approved the proposed amendments on September 16, 2014, for-
warding them to the Supreme Court for its consideration. 
6  See Order Approving Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, H.R. Doc. No. 
114-33 (2015). 
7  See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 353, 353–54 (2010) (explaining that “a ‘restrictive ethos’ prevails in procedure today, 
with many rules being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the 
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dure,8 the unyielding simplicity and permissiveness of the forms became too 
much for the otherwise changing system to bear. Below, then, is a eulogy of the 
forms.9 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 84 AND THE OFFICIAL FORMS 
A. Origins 
Appending forms to rules of court was a common practice at the time the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first adopted. The practice of including 
exemplary forms appears to have been a legacy of period when the legal system 
was characterized by the forms of action, which, in their day, required rigid and 
precise formulations of a claim in a writ from the Crown to gain access to the 
legal system and obtain a remedy.10 For example, the writ of right—which was 
the writ used by a tenant (call him “A”) who claimed that another (call him 
“B”) was in wrongful possession of land—would be addressed by the king to 
the landowner (call him “C”) in the following form: 
I command you that without delay you hold full right to A . . . concerning a 
virgate of land in Middleton which he claims to hold of you by such and such 
free service, and unless you do it my sheriff of Northamptonshire shall do it, that 
I may hear no further complaint about this matter for default of justice.11 
A tenant out of possession had to obtain such a writ and seek relief from 
his immediate lord or the judges of his lord’s feudal court.12 However, if the 
claimant to the property purported to be the owner of the land and not a mere 
tenant, the writ of right would have been inappropriate. Instead, the owner—
referred to as a “tenant in chief” because he claimed the land directly from the 
king—would need a different writ, referred to as a Praecipe quod reddat, 
which employed the following language: 
Command B that justly and without delay he render to A a hide of land in 
Middleton, whereof A complains that B unjustly deforces him, and if he will not 
                                                                                                                                
ability of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits in federal 
court”). 
8  Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
9  I use the term eulogy only to signify the impending elimination of the forms. At the time 
of this writing, Congress had yet to weigh in on the matter (this piece may be published after 
the time for them to do so expires); however, there is no prospect that Congress will inter-
vene to block their abrogation. 
10  F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 314 (A.H. 
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909) (“From time to time he [the king] interferes with ordi-
nary litigation; at the instance of a litigant he issues a writ commanding a feudal lord or a 
sheriff to do justice . . . .”). 
11  Id. at 317. 
12  See id. at 307. 
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do it, summon him that he be before my justices at such a place and time to an-
swer why he has not done it.13 
Use of the wrong writ meant that the defendant was not obliged to respond, 
which would prevent the claimant from receiving any relief.14 Thus, it was im-
portant that the proper form be used for the writ when commencing an action. 
Given their significance, it was beneficial for the proper formulations for 
the various forms of action to be documented and compiled for use by lawyers 
representing persons with various claims. This was done quite early in English 
legal history by Ranulf de Glanvill, the “Chief Justiciar” (roughly akin to a 
prime minister) of England during the reign of King Henry II.15 Circa 1188, 
Glanvill produced the first treatise on the laws of England.16 This work includ-
ed an explanation of the then extant legal process and systematic reference to 
the writs available at that time for a wide variety of circumstances, from a ten-
ant in wrongful possession of land17 to disputes over proper entitlement to a 
church.18 
Much later, we see extensive compilations of forms illustrating how to 
plead certain actions. For example, the widely used and highly regarded nine-
teenth century Treatise on Pleading by Joseph Chitty contained an entire vol-
ume of forms that served as a compendium of pleading examples covering eve-
ry conceivable type of claim or request that needed to be presented to a court.19 
Reviewing Chitty’s forms reveals detailed fill-in-the-blank forms for matters as 
diverse as “Writ of Entry to recover the Possession of Land,”20 “Declarations in 
Action Removed from Inferior Courts,”21 “Commencement of a Plea in Bar,”22 
and “Action to recover a Penalty of £100 for bribing a Voter at a Parliamentary 
Election.”23 By the 1930s when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were un-
der development, the practice guides for many American states as well as for 
England included an appendix of forms spelling out how to state the myriad 
claims one might assert.24 
                                                        
13  Id. at 317. 
14  Id. at 315 (“There is good reason to believe that Henry, in some ordinance lost to us, laid 
down the broad principle that no man need answer for his freehold without royal writ. Every 
one therefore who demands freehold land must obtain a writ; otherwise his adversary will 
not be bound to answer him.”). 
15  F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 13 (1908). 
16  RANULF DE GLANVILL, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE (ca. 
1188). 
17  See id. at 5. 
18  See id. at 80. 
19  See 2 JOSEPH CHITTY, CHITTY’S TREATISE ON PLEADING (16th American ed. 1879). 
20  Id. at 118. 
21  Id. at 6. 
22  Id. at 19. 
23  Id. at 92. 
24  See, e.g., English Annual Practice (1937) Appendix A to M inclusive; 2 Mass. Gen. Laws 
(Ter. Ed., 1932) ch. 231, § 147, Forms 1–47; Conn. Practice Book (1934) Rules, 47–68, pp. 
123–427. 
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Thus, it is not surprising that the drafters of the Federal Rules would follow 
suit by appending official forms to their work. This was achieved through a rule 
that referenced the forms, coupled with an Appendix containing the forms. 
What ultimately became Rule 84 initially appeared as Rule 86 and read as fol-
lows: 
Rule 86. Use of Forms. The forms attached to these rules in the Appendix of 
Forms, with appropriate changes as circumstances may require, shall be consid-
ered sufficient under these rules.25 
By November of 1937, proposed Rule 86 had been revised substantially: 
Rule 86. Forms. The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are intended to 
indicate, subject to the provisions of these rules, the simplicity and brevity of 
statement which the rules contemplate.26 
The note accompanying this revision explained that “[t]his change is to make it 
clear that the rules control the forms, and that the forms do not supersede the 
rules.”27 In presenting the forms, the Committee led with an “Introductory 
Statement” that announced, “The following forms are intended for illustration 
only. They are limited in number. No attempt is made to furnish a manual of 
forms.”28 This limitation—there were only twenty-seven forms29—was an in-
novation, as predecessor form compilations on which the Official Forms in the 
Federal Rules were based were voluminous and seemingly comprehensive.30 
Turning to the original Official Forms themselves, their content reflects 
their lineage in the predecessor forms discussed above. When one consults 
Chitty’s treatise and flips to the form for a complaint “Against the Owner of a 
Carriage for negligent driving,” one finds the following allegation: 
For that the defendant . . . so negligently drove his horse and carriage, that the 
same struck against the carriage and horse of the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff 
was hurt and prevented from following his business, and incurred expense in en-
deavoring to be cured.31 
                                                        
25  REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 215 (Apr. 1937). 
26  FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (Nov. 
1937). 
27  Id. at 56.  
28  FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006). 
29  That the forms were limited rather than comprehensive seemed to be lamentable to some, 
at least to the extent they left certain concepts within the Rules unilluminated. For example, 
in 1943 a proponent of having greater guidance regarding the grounds that could support a 
new trial motion under Rule 59 felt that because articulating all of the grounds would prove 
too difficult, the Official Forms could be enlisted to do the job: “I am inclined to believe that 
instead of attempting such an amendment, it would be better if illustrative forms of a motion 
for a new trial in a jury and in a non-jury case could be added to the Appendix of Forms.” 
Open Forum: Practice and Procedure, 10 INS. COUNSEL J. 33, 37 (1943). 
30  For example, the forms appended to Connecticut’s 1934 rules of practice were 680 in 
number. THE CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK OF 1934 (1934). 
31  CHITTY, supra note 19, at 574–75. 
1118 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1113  
The resonance of this form from Chitty with the form for a complaint for negli-
gence in the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—which alleged that “de-
fendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff” and was thus “in-
jured [and] was prevented from transacting his business”32—is not coincidental. 
Charles Clark, the reporter to the first Advisory Committee, revealed that origi-
nal Form 9 was “copied directly from the official form in Massachusetts. . . . It 
in turn is copied directly from Chitty and is the common law form of the action 
of trespass on the case.”33 Clark also acknowledged that other forms were di-
rect descendants of the common law forms: “Forms 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are devel-
oped directly from the common law forms in the action of general assumpsit.”34 
B. Purpose 
Although the forms trace their lineage to the common law forms used by 
the states and in England, the purpose of including the forms along with the 
new Federal Rules was not to perpetuate formalistic pleading but quite the op-
posite—to buttress the new vision of pleading espoused by the drafters of the 
rules. By now we should be quite familiar with the deliberate objective of the 
original Advisory Committee to eliminate the fact pleading that was prevalent 
in the codes at the time and move towards a simplified general form of plead-
ing.35 Charles Clark explained the rationale behind the abandonment of fact 
pleading on many occasions. During the road show presenting the rules to 
members of the American Bar Association in Cleveland, Ohio, Clark remarked: 
I think that the idea that you can pin another fellow down by the pleadings so 
that he can not escape from it is just a dream that never was successful any-
where, and that the courts have wasted more time over the years in trying to per-
                                                        
32  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 (1938). 
33  See RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 222–23 (William W. 
Dawson ed., 1938) [hereinafter CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS]; see also 2 Mass. Gen. 
Laws (Ter. Ed., 1932) ch. 231, § 147, Form 13 (“[T]he defendant so negligently and unskil-
fully [sic] drove a motor vehicle in a public highway, called _________ street, in Boston, 
that by reason thereof the said motor vehicle struck the plaintiff . . . .”). 
34  FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT 
WASHINGTON, D.C., AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 43 (Edward H. Hammond 
ed., 1938) [hereinafter WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS]; see also Ralph C. 
Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 ARK. L. REV. 1, 24 (1952–1953) (“Here will be 
seen evidence of the Federal Rules as lineal descendants of common law pleading for some 
of the forms are clearly taken from common law declarations in assumpsit and trespass on 
the case.”); CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33 at 227 (“Some of you who 
may have felt we are getting a little too far away from the common law ought to feel rather 
better by this, since it shows that . . . in the most ordinary, simple cases—contracts, debts 
and negligence—are based . . . on the common law forms, which have been found useful and 
. . . adequate for years.”). 
35  CLEVELAND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 33, at 220 (“These pleadings do call for 
what we should fairly term rather general pleadings.”). 
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fect allegations which make narrow issues than any possible gain can ever be 
worth.36 
To back up this goal, the drafters offered the forms as illustrations of the sim-
plified pleading that they contemplated more so than as documents intended for 
actual use in pleading. Clark described the forms early on as “examples of pro-
cedure to be followed” but “not . . . a lawyer’s manual or form book.”37 He lat-
er remarked, 
Those forms are not intended to be a desk manual so that whenever you have a 
case you won’t have to do any thinking about it. . . . That is not the purpose. The 
purpose is to illustrate the rules. These are the pictures that we hope will make 
the rules alive to you.38 
Given the predecessor fact-pleading regime to which many contemporary 
practitioners were accustomed, some were not enamored with forms that 
seemed over-simplified and devoid of facts. In response to the argument that 
the statement contained in Form 9 (the negligence complaint) was too thin, 
Clark defended the sufficiency of its simplicity when he stated, 
[I]f you are not looking for admissions or for something that will take the place 
of proof, if you are looking for a general statement which will send the case 
through the proper channels of the court and eventually provide for res adjudi-
cate, how could you ask for anything more? You have the case here differentiat-
ed from all other situations giving rise to legal relations requiring court action. It 
is the case of the pedestrian-automobile accident.39 
Elaborating on the same theme at a New York symposium on the new rules, 
Clark expanded: 
[A]n allegation which says simply that the defendant did injure the plaintiff 
through his negligence is too general and would not stand, for really that tells 
you no differentiating features about the case whatsoever . . . while on the other 
hand . . . the statement of the act in question in a general way, and with the char-
acterization that it is negligent, is sufficient. That is the allegation in this form 
(Form 9). Here, instead of saying defendant’s negligence caused the injury, you 
say that the defendant negligently drove his automobile against the plaintiff, 
who was then crossing the street, and you have then the case isolated from every 
other kind of case of the same character, really from every other case. . . . At the 
pleading stage, in advance of the evidence, before the parties know how the case 
is going to shape up, that is all, in all fairness, you can require.40 
For Clark—and presumably for the other drafters as well—the pleadings 
were not intended to serve additional functions beyond informing the defendant 
                                                        
36  Id. at 220. 
37  Charles E. Clark, Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 451 & 
n.43 (1936). 
38  WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 42. 
39  Id. at 44. 
40  Id. at 241. 
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of the nature of the action and distinguishing it from others.41 Obtaining further 
information was the office of the discovery devices the drafters created: 
[J]ust send around a series of questions to your opponent and ask him to answer 
them, and he is expected to do it. That isn’t part of the pleading; that is Deposi-
tion and Discovery, and is mainly there for the purpose of giving you infor-
mation to prepare your case. . . . That is the way to clear up points of dispute, not 
by the pleadings proper.42 
Thus, we see a clear intention that the Official Forms be regarded as the exam-
ples of the new simplified pleading regime, a message the drafters felt would 
not be sufficiently clear or embraced were lawyers left to the guidance of the 
rules alone. 
II. EARLY EXPERIENCE UNDER THE FORMS 
A. Early Invocations of the Forms 
From the beginning of the life of the Federal Rules, we see the forms ful-
filling the function envisioned by the drafters, as they were invoked by courts 
and litigants on many occasions to confirm that the new rules did not require 
particularized pleading in the ordinary case. For example, in Sierocinski v. E.I. 
Du Pont de Nemours & Co.43 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negli-
gent in manufacturing a dynamite cap but did not specify what actions of the 
manufacturer were negligent in particular. As a result, the district court granted 
the defendant’s “motion to strike” the complaint because it failed to set forth 
any specific act of negligence.44 The Third Circuit reversed, citing Form 9 as 
supporting the notion that a general allegation of negligence sufficed, and add-
ed, “[i]f defendant needs further information to prepare its defense it can obtain 
it by interrogatories.”45 Similarly, in Sparks v. England,46 a defendant com-
plaining that the plaintiff had failed to plead specific facts showing that the al-
leged tort was “willful” was rebuffed by the court with a reference the Official 
Forms: 
The Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a plaintiff shall plead eve-
ry fact essential to his right to recover the amount which he claims. The re-
quirement is, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief,” and “a demand for judgment for the relief to which he 
deems himself entitled.” The appendix of forms accompanying the rules illus-
                                                        
41  Charles E. Clark, Summary Judgments, 2 F.R.D. 364, 366 (1941) (“The essence of mod-
ern pleading is the generalized form of statement which gives fair notice of opposing claims, 
but avoids the detailed particularization of the old special pleading. . . . Hence the trend is to 
such simple forms of allegation and denial as are shown by the forms attached to the new 
federal rules . . . .”). 
42  WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 42. 
43  Sierocinski v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1939). 
44  Id. at 843. 
45  Id. at 844. 
46  Sparks v. England, 113 F.2d 579 (8th Cir. 1940). 
Summer 2015] THE FORMS HAD A FUNCTION 1121 
trates how simply a claim may be pleaded and with how few factual aver-
ments.47 
Other courts were in accord with this view.48 Commentators of the day, too, 
regularly invoked the forms to support the assertion that fact pleading had been 
slayed by the new Federal Rules.49 Clark himself would continue to reiterate 
this point as well, writing that the abandonment of code pleading’s emphasis on 
pleading facts “is shown more clearly in the federal Appendix of Forms.”50 
Although the Official Forms were intended to illustrate the drafters’ vision, 
early understanding of the forms was that they also were sufficient if used.51 In 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Cohen,52 a New York court rejected 
a challenge to the sufficiency of a jurisdictional allegation because the plaintiff 
had simply invoked the language found in Form 2—“the matter in controversy 
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000.”53 Specifi-
cally, the court wrote, “[t]his is sufficient under Rule 84. . . . Jurisdiction is suf-
ficiently alleged if Form 2 in the Appendix of Forms is followed.”54 The court 
in Corcoran v. Royal Development Co.55 similarly acknowledged the sufficien-
cy of the forms: “The complaint alleges: ‘Third: The matter in controversy ex-
ceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Three thousand ($3,000.00) 
Dollars.’ This allegation standing alone is all that the pleader need allege. See 
Form 2.”56 One court went as far as to strike specific allegations of negligence 
because under “the New Rules” and Form 9, “a mere general charge of negli-
gence is sufficient” and thus “the allegations contained in the third paragraph of 
the petition have now no place therein.”57 Although this approach would be at 
odds with the generally accepted view that the forms were not mandatory, it 
confirms the contemporaneous treatment of the Official Forms as more than 
hortatory. 
                                                        
47  Id. at 581 (citations omitted). 
48  See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Young, 107 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir. 1939) (citing then-Form 9 to 
beat back a pleading sufficiency challenge). 
49  See, e.g., Marlyn E. Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 53 
W. VA. L. REV. 195, 251 (1951) (“The official forms in the appendix to the Federal Rules 
indicate that the rule requiring one to plead according to the legal effect has been abolished 
and that those rules require no verbalism to state a claim.”); Walter G. Schwartz, Comment, 
Negligence Pleading: Alleging Defendant’s Breach of Duty, 35 CAL. L. REV. 267, 268 
(1947) (“[A]s against a general demurrer . . . it is sufficient to allege that the defendant neg-
ligently did some act, without specifying the exact means or manner. California cases and 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in accord.”) (citing then-Form 9, now Form 11). 
50  Charles E. Clark, Book Review, 62 YALE L.J. 292, 296 (1953). 
51  See, e.g., The Official Forms, 4 FED. R. SERV. 954, 954 (1941) (“Nevertheless, the forms 
should normally be considered sufficient as against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim.”). 
52  Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 27 F. Supp. 735 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). 
53  Id. at 736. 
54  Id. 
55  Corcoran v. Royal Dev. Co., 35 F. Supp. 400 (E.D.N.Y 1940). 
56  Id. at 401. 
57  Hardin v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., Inc., 26 F. Supp. 97, 97 (S.D. Ohio 1939). 
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Although a major function of the forms was to disabuse observers of the 
notion that the fact pleading of old survived the advent of the Federal Rules, 
they also illuminated the nature of practice under the new rules in other ways. 
For example, one question raised early on was whether the proper motion in 
response to a defective summons or an insufficient service of process was a 
motion to quash or a motion to dismiss—the term “motion to quash” did not 
appear in the Rules but was theretofore the typical method of responding to a 
deficient service of process. Although one court concluded “[u]nder the new 
Rules of Civil Procedure . . . the motion to dismiss on the ground of insuffi-
ciency of process is the proper procedure,”58 one commentator at the time 
pointed out that Form 19 contemplated the use of a motion to quash. Form 19 
then read: 
To dismiss the action or in lieu thereof to quash the return of service of sum-
mons on the grounds (a) that the defendant is a corporation organized under the 
laws of Delaware and was not and is not subject to service of process within the 
Southern District of New York, and (b) that the defendant has not been properly 
served with process in this action.59 
The commentator thus concluded that the motion to quash remained available 
under the new rules. To cite another example, in support of his view that it was 
permissible to have “speaking motions” that included facts in support of a mo-
tion, original Advisory Committee member Edson Sunderland wrote, “[i]t is 
obviously contemplated that facts may be set forth as grounds of the motions 
presenting most of these [Rule 12] defenses” and cited Form 19 as support.60 
B. Challenges to the New Regime 
Notwithstanding the clear message of the drafters regarding their intent to 
depart from the formalized pleading under the codes—as illustrated by the Of-
ficial Forms—resistance to liberal pleading remained. Although, as just dis-
cussed, the forms were invoked in response to such resistance, it appears their 
illustrative—rather than authoritative—status provided some courts with a basis 
for disregarding them. Several facts demonstrated that the forms could be re-
garded as merely illustrative. Recall that Charles Clark stated that the forms did 
not provide a manual but rather “[t]he purpose is to illustrate the rules.”61 Fur-
ther, the “Introductory Statement” that appeared before the forms read, “The 
                                                        
58  Smith v. Belmore, 1 F.R.D. 633, 634 (E.D. Wash. 1941). 
59  Claude H. Brown, Some Problems Concerning Motions Under Federal Rule 12(b), 27 
MINN. L. REV. 415, 417 (1943) (quoting Form 19). 
60  EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND 
JURISDICTION OF COURTS 878 n.88 (2d ed. 1948). 
61  WASHINGTON & NEW YORK FRCP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 34, at 42; see also JAMES 
WILLIAM MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW 
FEDERAL RULES § 84.01 (1938) (“They are limited in number . . . and, therefore, are mainly 
illustrative.”). 
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following forms are intended for illustration only.”62 Finally, a prior version of 
Rule 84 that would have provided that the forms “shall be considered sufficient 
under these rules” was rejected in favor of the version of Rule 84 that ultimate-
ly was promulgate, pronouncing the rules as indicative rather than sufficient.63 
Two early decisions were notable for their espousal of the “merely illustra-
tive” view. In Washburn v. Moorman Manufacturing Co.,64 a California court 
rejected the plaintiff’s use of one of the Official Forms by stating, “[t]hese 
forms are merely to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the 
rules contemplate. . . . In the instant case no fact is stated to support the conclu-
sion of ‘implied contract’ to pay.”65 More dramatic, perhaps, was the court’s 
rejection of the sufficiency of the forms in Employers’ Mutual Liability Insur-
ance Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co.: 
It is contended, however, by the plaintiff that its complaint is in substantial com-
pliance with the form prescribed by the Supreme Court in adopting the New 
Rules of Civil Procedure. An examination of the form supports plaintiff in its 
contention. However, these forms do not dispense with the necessity, as occa-
sion may require, for a statement of certain details or particulars which would 
enable the defendant more readily to prepare and file a responsive pleading.66 
The response to these cases was a 1946 proposal to amend Rule 84 to make 
explicit what the preponderance of courts had already recognized: that the Offi-
cial Forms were sufficient and could be relied upon if used to withstand chal-
lenge. This was achieved by amending Rule 84 to read as follows: 
The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and 
are intended to indicate, subject to the provisions of these rules, the simplicity 
and brevity of statement which these rules contemplate.67 
Thus, the 1946 amendment resurrected the abandoned language from the April 
1937 proposed Rule 86, retaining the last clause added in November of that 
same year. More than that, the amendment deleted the language subjecting the 
forms “to the provisions of these rules,” a move that placed them on par with 
the Rules themselves rather than subordinate to them.68 The note accompanying 
this change explained that the change was made “to discourage isolated results 
                                                        
62  FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006). 
63  FED. R. CIV. P. 86 (Apr. 1937 draft). 
64  Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1938). 
65  Id. at 546. 
66  Employers’ Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Blue Line Transfer Co., 2 F.R.D. 121, 123 (W.D. 
Mo. 1941). 
67  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 118 (June 1946). 
68  Some members of the bar were not supportive of this change. See, e.g., First Report of 
Special Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Regarding Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 11 J. B. ASS’N D.C. 439, 450 (1944) (“[I]t is 
deemed unwise to bind a court in advance to any crystallized form of pleading which may or 
may not fit the particular claim to which it is sought to be applied.”). 
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such as those found in Washburn v. Moorman Mfg. Co. [and] Employers Mutu-
al Liability Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Blue Line Transfer Co.,”69 the cases dis-
cussed above. Although the amendment neglected to revise the Introductory 
Statement that seemed to limit the forms to illustrative status,70 the revised lan-
guage of Rule 84 left no doubt about the matter.71 
Nevertheless, resistance to liberal pleading endured in many quarters—
something that the Supreme Court stepped in to address in its 1957 decision in 
Conley v. Gibson.72 Rejecting the defendants’ assertion that the plaintiffs were 
obliged to plead the facts underlying their discrimination claims, the Court 
wrote, 
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth specific 
facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismissal is 
therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he 
bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is “a short and plain state-
ment of the claim” that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s 
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to 
the Rules plainly demonstrate this.73 
Contemporaneous academic commentary echoed the connection between the 
forms and the looser approach to pleading sanctioned under the Rules and af-
firmed by Conley.74 Indeed, the great Jack Weinstein valorized the Official 
Forms not too long after this time when he noted that practice under the 1962 
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) would have been enhanced 
by preparation of an official set of forms to avoid the inevitable pleading dis-
putes that would arise under those rules.75 
                                                        
69  ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 67, at 119. 
70  MOORE’S FEDERAL RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS 176 (1947). 
71  At the same time Rule 84 was amended as described, Rule 12(e) was amended to elimi-
nate the motion for a bill of particulars, a device whose existence was in tension both with 
the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a) and the provision for expansive discovery in the 
Federal Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e), 1946 Advisory Committee Note. 
72  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
73  Id. at 47. 
74  See, e.g., Robert Kovach, Problems of Plaintiff in Pleading Negligence, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 
435, 449 (1962) (citing the forms as confirmation that the Rules approve of pleading negli-
gence in the style permitted under the common law); Roy F. Shields, Proceedings of the 
Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges: Advantages to a Trial Lawyer of a 
Pre-Trial Conference, 23 F.R.D. 319, 344 (1958) (“While I find no authority for notice 
pleadings in the body of the Federal Rules, there is support for them in the Appendix of 
Forms, 28 U.S.C.A. For example, Form 4 indicates that in an action on an account the com-
plaint need allege only that ‘defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars according to the 
account hereto annexed as Exhibit A.’ ”); Note, The Admission in Evidence of Pleadings Un-
der the Codes and Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 98, 107 
(1957) (“Examples annexed to the rules make clear that considerably less detail is required 
than in code jurisdictions. Emphasis is on the giving of notice, supplementary discovery pro-
cedures being available for exploration of fact.”). 
75  Jack B. Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1439–40 (1962) 
(“Much of the difficulty with pleading in New York could be avoided if an appendix of 
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III. THE FORMS IN MODERN TIMES 
Since the 1960s through the present, the Official Forms have been used in 
ways similar to how they have been used from the beginning: as a source of in-
structional guidance for how to plead both ordinary and special claims like 
fraud and patent claims, as well as the pleading of jurisdiction and other mat-
ters. Below is a brief sampling of the more recent judicial output on this score. 
A. Stating an Ordinary Claim 
The Supreme Court’s most recent invocation of the forms was in 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,76 in which it rebuffed an attempt to require the plain-
tiff to plead additional facts supporting his claim of age and national origin dis-
crimination by citing to the “simple requirements of Rule 8(a).”77 In the Court’s 
words, these “simple” requirements “are exemplified by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure Forms, which ‘are sufficient under the rules and are intended to 
indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contem-
plate.’ ”78 Justice Stevens cited to the forms in his dissent in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly79 as a basis for opposing the majority’s reading of a fact-pleading 
“plausibility” requirement into Rule 8(a); he wrote, “The pleading paradigm 
under the new Federal Rules was well illustrated by the inclusion in the appen-
dix of Form 9, a complaint for negligence,” which clearly permits what “would 
have been called a ‘conclusion of law’ under the code pleading of old.”80 Low-
er courts have done what the Swierkiewicz court did with Form 9 (now Form 
11)—deploy it to push back against urgings to impose fact-pleading require-
ments on plaintiffs.81 Obviously, the Supreme Court itself has not embraced 
                                                                                                                                
forms were promulgated by the Judicial Conference. This would follow the helpful practice 
in England, the federal courts, Connecticut, and other jurisdictions. While the legislature 
struck out of the CPLR all references to official forms, it was understood that there was no 
objection to preparation of an official set of forms. Standard, simple forms in pleading as 
well as other areas could greatly reduce the burden of paper work now weighing down law-
yers, judges, and clerks.”); see also Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on 
Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 523 (1957) (“An ap-
pendix of forms can be utilized to clarify the rules and to illustrate the specificity and sim-
plicity desired.”). 
76  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
77  Id. at 513. 
78  Id. at 513 n.4 (quoting Rule 84). 
79  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
80  Id. at 575–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
81  See, e.g., Ruffin v. Nicely, 183 Fed. App’x 505, 513 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In light of 
Swierkiewicz and Form 9, Ruffin need not allege all elements of or all facts necessary for a 
prima facie claim under any of his theories of relief.”). The court in In re Initial Public Of-
fering Securities Litigation, did a particularly nice job of articulating the form-based argu-
ment against a requirement of heightened fact pleading: 
Rule 8(a) does not require plaintiffs to plead the legal theory, facts or elements underlying 
their claim. There is nothing in Form 9, for example, to support plaintiff’s accusation of negli-
gence. “It does not say, for example, whether the hypothetical defendant was speeding, driving 
without lights, or driving on the wrong side of the road.” Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 
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such a use of the forms given its revised approach to pleading in Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.82 Indeed, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has cited 
the tension between Twombly and Iqbal on the one hand and the Official Forms 
on the other as one justification for abolishing the forms.83 
B. Pleading Special Claims 
1. Fraud Allegations 
From the beginning, the Federal Rules have made special provision for the 
pleading of fraud allegations, requiring that “the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”84 What such particularity 
entailed has similarly been illustrated in the Official Forms since the inception 
of the Federal Rules in Form 13: “Defendant C. D. on or about . . . . conveyed 
all of his property, real and personal [or specify and describe] to defendant E.F. 
for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff.”85 Thus, courts took to citing Form 13 
to reject assertions that fraud claims were insufficiently pleaded. For example, 
in Powell, Inc. v. Abney,86 a Texas court used Form 13 in this way: 
Union Carbide next contends that the Plaintiff’s third-party complaint 
should be stricken for failure to aver the circumstances of fraud with particulari-
ty as required by Rule 9(b). Rule 9(b), however, must be read in conjunction 
with the Rule 8(a), which merely requires “a short and plain statement of the 
claim.” Indeed, Official Form 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
illustrates that the federal rules merely require notice pleading.87 
In In re Longhorn Securities Litigation,88 another court did the same, re-
jecting the defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs common 
law fraud, securities fraud, and RICO claims by stating, “Rule 9(b) does not re-
quire detailed fact pleading of claims of fraud,” citing Form 13.89 In 1991 we 
find an example of the invocation of Form 13 in a New York federal court: 
[I]n a motion under Rule 9(b) “it is inappropriate to focus exclusively on the fact 
that Rule 9(b) requires particularity in pleading fraud.” Rather, a court must 
                                                                                                                                
F.3d 418, 423 (D.C.Cir.1996). Nor does it outline the four elements of negligence and explain 
how each is satisfied. “Form 9 thus treats the mere allegation of negligence as sufficient.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Form 9’s allegations are wholly conclusory: by simply describing the claim in 
a short and plain fashion, Form 9 satisfies the Federal Rules. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 84. 
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
82  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
83  COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 276 (Aug. 2013) (“[T]he pleading forms live in tension 
with recently developing approaches to general pleading standards.”). 
84  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (1938). 
85  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 13 (1938) (alteration in original). 
86  Powell, Inc. v. Abney, 83 F.R.D. 482 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
87  Id. at 487 (citations omitted). 
88  In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Okla. 1983). 
89  Id. at 263. 
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strike a “balance between the simplicity sought in Rule 8 and the particularity 
required by Rule 9.” An example of this balance “is demonstrated by the illus-
trative fraud claim set out in Official Form 13, which is expressly declared to be 
a sufficient pleading by Rule 84.” An examination of the complaint reveals that 
the plaintiff closely followed Form 13 in preparing the complaint. Accordingly, 
the Court finds that the complaint, as presently drawn, satisfies the requirements 
of Rule 9(b).90 
Many other instances of the same usage of Form 13 could be cited; a few addi-
tional such cases are referenced in the margin.91 
After the 2007 restyling of the Federal Rules, Form 13 became Form 21. 
What is interesting is that the form continued to be cited in support of the min-
imal burden associated with fraud pleading, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Twombly and Iqbal decisions moved the ordinary pleading standard away from 
its notice pleading roots. For example, in 2011 the federal court in Minnesota 
wrote, “[i]f the somewhat bare-bones assertions in Form 21 suffice to plead a 
fraudulent-conveyance claim, then the Complaint here must similarly pass mus-
ter. And Twombly and Iqbal do not (and cannot) change that result.”92 Other 
courts continued to cite Form 21 post-Twiqbal as well.93 However, such a view 
of Form 21 was not unanimous; Kelleher v. Kelleher94 is illustrative here: 
Plaintiff raises the argument that her fraudulent transfer claims are proper 
because they comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
Form 21. Form 21, which is contained in the Appendix of Forms attached to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires Plaintiff merely to identify the under-
lying debt and the allegedly fraudulent transfer. However, the Court does not 
agree that Form 21 obviates the heightened pleading requirements for fraud un-
                                                        
90  United States v. Gelb, 783 F. Supp. 748, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citations omitted) (quoting 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1298, at 
621, 623, 624). 
91  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1079 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (citing Form 13 to confirm that plaintiff pleaded the circumstances surrounding an 
alleged fraudulent transfer under Illinois state law with sufficient particularity to satisfy Rule 
9(b)); Kipperman v. Onex Corp., No. 1:05-CV-1242-JOF, 2007 WL 2872463, at *7 (N.D. 
Ga. Sept. 26, 2007) (“Although it arises in the context of federal joinder, this court agrees 
with the Seventh Circuit that Form 13 provides a good indication of what one must plead in 
a fraudulent conveyance claim under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act to satisfy the pur-
poses of Rule 9(b).”); Sharp v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. (In re Commercial Fin. 
Servs., Inc.), 322 B.R. 440, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2003) (citing Form 13 as illustrating the 
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s fraud complaint); Nielsen v. Mitchell, No. S85-572, 1986 WL 
31577 at *72 (N.D. Ind. May 5, 1986) (“Official Form 13, which is expressly declared suffi-
cient by Rule 84, presents a model for pleading fraud . . . . Thus, very deferential review of a 
complaint is appropriate on a Rule 9(b) motion.”). 
92  United States v. Bame, 778 F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (D. Minn. 2011). 
93  See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Bank of the Ozarks, No. 4:11CV00280-
JLH, 2011 WL 3444063, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 8, 2011). 
94  Kelleher v. Kelleher, No. 13-cv-05450-MEJ, 2014 WL 94197 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014). 
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der Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the Court declines to hold that a claim sufficient to 
complete Form 21 satisfies Rule 9(b) as a matter of law.95 
Here we see the beginnings of the tension between the forms and the plausibil-
ity pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal, a tension that—as we will see 
below—persisted and became a source of concern for the rulemakers. 
2. Patent Claims 
Unlike claims of fraud, patent claims are not subject to a particularized 
pleading requirement but rather fall within the ordinary pleading standard of 
Rule 8(a). Nevertheless, the Official Forms offered a form dedicated to the 
pleading of patent infringement claims and have done so from the beginning. 
What began as Form 16 became Form 18 after the 2007 restyling of the Federal 
Rules. Both before and after the restyling the form was cited to support the suf-
ficiency of patent claims. R2 Technology, Inc. v. Intelligent Systems Software, 
Inc.96 exemplifies the use of Form 16 prior to 2007: “[T]he Rule 8 standard 
does not change in an action for patent infringement. Indeed, it is apparent from 
the form patent infringement complaint that a complaint need only identify the 
patent, not the specific claims, being asserted.”97 Other instances of such use 
abound.98 
What is more interesting, however, is how Form 18 has been regarded by 
lower courts since the Twombly and Iqbal decisions called into doubt the de-
                                                        
95  Id. at *6 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. A & M Dev., LLC, No. 
1:11-cv-00336-BLW, 2012 WL 1883460, at *3 (D. Idaho May 21, 2012) (“By its own terms, 
Form 21 is designed to illustrate a ‘Claim . . . to Set Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance. . . . 
Moreover, the advisory committee notes following Rule 84 suggest that the purpose of 
providing the Forms was to prevent litigants from having to guess the meaning of the lan-
guage of Rule 8 regarding the form of the complaint. The Court can find no controlling au-
thority indicating that the Forms were intended to address the heightened pleading standard 
set forth in Rule 9(b).”). 
96  R2 Tech., Inc. v. Intelligent Sys. Software, Inc., No. 02-472-GMS, 2002 WL 31260049 
(D. Del. Oct. 9, 2002). 
97  Id. at *3 (citations omitted). 
98  See, e.g., Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Ltd., No. C-06-0162 MMC, 2006 WL 
1233148, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2006) (“Here, Nichia’s allegation that Creative Defendants 
are infringing Nichia’s patents by selling consumer products containing a specific type of 
LED, the ‘902 series’ manufactured by SSC, is at least as specific, if not more so, than [the 
description of the patented invention in Form 16], and, consequently, is sufficient for pur-
poses of Rule 8(a).”); OKI Elec. Indus. Co. v. LG Semicon Co., No. CIV. 97-20310-SW, 
1998 WL 101737, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1998) (“No allegation that infringing devices 
were made, used, or sold in, or imported into the United States is contained in Form 16, and 
yet the Form is ‘sufficient under the rules.’ Form 16 thus makes it clear that an explicit alle-
gation of infringement in the United States is not necessary.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 84)); 
Ergobilt, Inc. v. Neutral Posture Ergonomics, Inc., No. CA3-77-CV-2548-R, 1998 WL 
483626, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1998) (“Because the allegations in NPE’s patent in-
fringement counterclaim conform to the Official Form, they withstand ErgoBilt’s motion to 
dismiss.”); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 960 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (stating 
that “[t]he Federal Rules do not require that the plaintiff plead with particularity the specific 
patent claims that have been infringed . . . .”). 
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gree of simplicity with which one could articulate claims in a complaint. A 
multitude of courts have continued to affirm that, given Rule 84’s proclamation 
that Form 18 is sufficient, they are bound to find that patent claims that comply 
with the form can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.99 In 
doing so, many have noted the tension between Twiqbal and Form 18 explicitly 
before proceeding to affirm the sufficiency of Form 18-compliant complaints. 
For example, in Intravisual Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics America Inc., the 
court wrote: 
[T]he pleading requirement set forth in Twombly and Iqbal do not require a pa-
tentee to specifically identify where in the United States the accused products 
are made or name an individual who has purchased, attempted to purchase, used, 
or imported one of the accused products in the United States. . . . A patent in-
fringement complaint that pleads at least the facts in Form 18 must be sufficient 
to state a claim under Rule 8(a) because to hold otherwise would render Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 84 a nullity.100 
The court reached this conclusion in part based on the fact that after Twombly 
was decided, the Federal Circuit affirmed the sufficiency of the patent form in 
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,101 although without acknowledgement or exten-
sive analysis of the tension between the form and Twombly’s plausibility stand-
ard.102 A more definitive affirmation of the authoritativeness of Form 18 came 
later in In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing System Patent Litiga-
tion,103 in which the Federal Circuit declared, “to the extent the parties argue 
that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the Forms and create differing 
pleadings requirements, the Forms control.”104 A multitude of other courts have 
expressed the view that Form 18 remains controlling notwithstanding Twiq-
                                                        
99  See, e.g., Kelora Sys., LLC v. Target Corp., No. C-11-01548 CW, 2011 WL 2149085 
(N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (evaluating a challenged patent claim against the elements found 
in Form 18); Intravisual Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics Am. Inc., No. 2:10-CV-90-TJW, 
2011 WL 1004873, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011) (“This Court has held that so long as a 
complaint complies with Form 18 in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, its claims for direct and indirect patent infringement will survive a motion to 
dismiss.”). 
100  Intravisual, 2011 WL 1004873, at *3. 
101  McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2007). 
102  It is worth noting that in McZeal, there was a dissent by Judge Dyk in which he quarreled 
with the fact that Rule 84 would obligate compliant allegations to be approved notwithstand-
ing their failure to provide sufficient notice and argued that patent claims under the so-called 
“doctrine of equivalents” should not be treated as being covered by the official patent form. 
Id. at 1361. Freed from the official form, Judge Dyk would have applied Twombly to rule 
that the statement of the patent claim in McZeal was insufficient. Id. at 1363 (Dyk, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
103  In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
104  Id. at 1334. 
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bal.105 As we will see below, however, dissenting views have recently 
emerged.106 
C. Pleading Jurisdiction 
Beyond illustrating the standard for stating claims, the forms revealed the 
simplicity with which one may plead jurisdiction. This occurred in Form 7, 
merely requiring—for diversity jurisdiction—the statement of the citizenship of 
the parties and an affirmation that the amount in controversy exceeds the re-
quired value.107 Alleging jurisdiction under a federal statute is even simpler: the 
allegation need only state “this action arises under,” followed by a citation to 
the relevant constitutional provision, treaty, or federal statute at issue.108 
Thus, courts have cited to Form 7 to reject urgings to impose more strin-
gent pleading requirements on jurisdictional allegations.109 The court’s state-
ment in Karazanos v. Madison Two Associates110 is illustrative: 
                                                        
105  See, e.g., e-LYNXX Corp. v. InnerWorkings, Inc., No. 1-10-cv-02535, 2011 WL 
3608642, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2011) (“Since the Federal Rules cannot be changed by a 
judicial decision, Form 18 must necessarily demonstrate an acceptable way of stating a claim 
for direct infringement.”); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 
667, 675 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“It is difficult to reconcile the pleading standards set forth in 
Twombly and Iqbal with the legally conclusive form of pleading found in Form 18. Howev-
er, the Court agrees with the post-Twombly holding in McZeal that a litigant who complies 
with the provisions of Form 18 has sufficiently stated a claim for direct infringement as con-
templated by Rule 12(b)(6).”); Petersen Indus., Inc. v. Hol-Mac Corp., No. 4:10-cv-152-
CWR-FKB, 2011 WL 577377, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 9, 2011) (“Despite pre-dating 
Twombly, the logic of McZeal still stands.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 741 
F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Some district courts have concluded similarly that 
while the Court otherwise must apply the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal to pa-
tent claims and counterclaims, for allegations of direct infringement, pleading in conform-
ance with Form 18 is sufficient.”); Realtime Data, LLC v. Stanley, 721 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 
(E.D. Tex. 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have not affected 
the adequacy of complying with Form 18. To hold otherwise would render Rule 84 and 
Form 18 invalid, which cannot be done by judicial action”); see also Richard A. Kamprath, 
Article, Patent Pleading Standards After Iqbal: Applying Infringement Contention as a 
Guide, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 301, 312 (2010) (noting that Rule 84 requires courts to 
accept as sufficient any pleading made in conformance with the forms and that Form 18 can 
still be used to plead patent infringement cases even though the form may appear to be in-
congruent with Twombly and Iqbal). 
106  See infra Part IV; see also, e.g., Wistron Corp. v. Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., No. C-
10-4458 EMC, 2011 WL 4079231 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (granting motion to dismiss 
notwithstanding compliance with Form 18). 
107  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 7. 
108  Id. But see Gay v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 681, 685 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (finding no re-
quirement to plead specific section of a statute notwithstanding the inclusion of such cita-
tions in Form 7). 
109  See, e.g., Mechler v. United States, No. 12-1183-EFM-GLR, 2012 WL 5289627, at *2 
n.20 (D. Kan. Oct. 23, 2012) (“[A]s shown in Form 7 of the Appendix of Forms of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, a statement of jurisdiction based on a specifically identified 
federal statute may be adequate to plead federal question jurisdiction.”). 
110  Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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We must therefore decide whether the hypothetical possibility that one of 
the “foreign citizen[s]” may be a permanent resident alien in Illinois is enough to 
render Madison Two’s jurisdictional allegations defective. In order to reach that 
conclusion, we would have to hold that the party seeking federal jurisdiction 
(here, the defendant, because the context is removal) must not only allege that 
certain parties are foreign citizens or subjects, but must also allege that they are 
not permanent residents of the United States. Nothing in the Appendix of Forms 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports imposing this kind of pleading 
burden, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 84, Form 2. . . . Typically the party seeking jurisdiction 
pleads the jurisdictional facts required—A is a citizen of Idaho, the amount in 
controversy exceeds $75,000, B is a citizen of France—and it is up to the party 
opposing federal jurisdiction to contest the facts as pleaded.111 
Since Twombly and Iqbal, Form 7 has been read as consistent with the standard 
imposed by those cases, since the form offers facts that form the basis for the 
plaintiff’s assertion of diversity jurisdiction.112 
To take another example, the forms make clear that Rule 8(a)’s admonition 
to offer “a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s ju-
risdiction depends” does not refer to personal jurisdiction but rather only sub-
ject matter jurisdiction: “Any doubt that the term ‘jurisdiction’ in this context 
refers to subject matter rather than personal jurisdiction can be resolved by ref-
erence to Form 2 [now Form 7] of the Rules, which speaks only of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.”113 In Dunlop-McCullen v. Pascarella, a third-party defendant 
sought summary judgment on the ground that the third-party plaintiffs failed to 
allege jurisdiction at all in their third-party complaints.114 The court rejected the 
challenge by stating, “It is instructive that Form 22-A [now Form 16] attached 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is a model for third-party com-
plaints, does not include a jurisdictional statement.”115 
D. Other Uses 
In addition to providing guidance on pleading jurisdiction and claims, the 
Appendix of Forms also contained illustrations of how litigants should craft 
their answers to complaints. Former Form 21 (now part of Form 30) backed up 
                                                        
111  Id. at 627–28; see also, e.g., J. E. Sieben Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Davenport, 494 F. 
Supp. 1035, 1036 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (“Defendant city of Davenport seeks dismissal of the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiff has not pleaded suf-
ficient facts to confer diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court does not 
agree. The amended complaint is in conformity with [Form 2] which, by operation of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 84, is sufficient.”). 
112  Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
the Supreme Court reiterated that a complaint must include more than just conclusory allega-
tions to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. . . . Form 7(a) requires more than just a 
recitation of the legal conclusion that the parties are diverse. It requires the assertion of facts 
regarding the location of a party’s principal place of business.”). 
113  Stirling Homex Corp. v. Homosote Co., 437 F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1971). 
114  No. 97-Civ.-0195(PKL)(DFE), 2002 WL 31521012, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2002). 
115  Id. at *23 n.45. 
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the straightforward proposition in Rule 8(b) that all allegations must be admit-
ted or denied, including jurisdictional allegations.116 Thus, when the defendant 
in McKinney v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange responded to a jurisdictional al-
legation by stating, “Defendant admits that Plaintiff purports to bring this ac-
tion pursuant to Title VII and the claimed jurisdiction, but denies any implica-
tion that said statute has been violated or that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief,” 
the court cited former Form 21 to reject the response: 
Both this Court and McKinney are entitled to know whether Exchange and its 
counsel see any jurisdictional flaw lurking in the Complaint. . . . There seems to 
be no reason whatever that Exchange should not simply admit the jurisdictional 
allegations (see, e.g., Form 21 in the Appendix of Forms following the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 84 of which places an official imprimatur on 
such forms).117 
Recourse to the forms has also been a component of the debate regarding 
the applicability of the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal to the plead-
ing of affirmative defenses, though by no means did such usage begin only af-
ter those cases.118 As litigants and courts have argued over whether affirmative 
defense allegations must meet the Twiqbal standard, Form 30’s example has 
been interpreted by both sides as supporting their respective positions. The 
court in Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co. succinctly states the view of 
those who see Form 30 as confirmation of a slight pleading burden: “[A]s the 
undetailed recitations of affirmative defenses illustrated in Form 30 show, [it] is 
not an exacting standard even remotely approaching the type of notice required 
of a claim under Twombly and Iqbal.”119 On the other side, the court in Ham-
mer v. Peninsula Poultry Equipment Co. has read Form 30 as indicative of a 
fact-pleading requirement for affirmative defenses: “a proper affirmative de-
fense, as illustrated in Form 30, includes ‘not only the name of the affirmative 
                                                        
116  FED. R. CIV. P. Form 21 (2006) (stating that “Defendant admits the allegations stated in 
paragraph 1,” which referred to the allegation of jurisdiction in former Form 8). 
117  McKinney v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., No. 95-C-6560, 1996 WL 31181, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 24, 1996); see also, e.g., Morgan v. Stringer, No. 96-C-1107, 1996 WL 180074, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 1996) (“It is not the province of any pleader to decline to respond to an 
allegation based on the pleader’s own opinion as to the propriety of that allegation--whether 
by characterizing it as ‘stat[ing] a legal conclusion’ or otherwise. Indeed, that type of self-
help is especially inappropriate here, for the official Appendix of Forms that follows the 
Rules (see Rule 84) expressly contemplates a defendant’s admission of a complaint’s juris-
dictional allegation (see Form 21 in that Appendix).”). 
118  See, e.g., Donald K. Bjelke, Pleading: Raising Defense of Limitations: California and 
Federal Practice Compared, 43 CAL. L. REV. 724, 725–26 (1955) (citing Form 20 as a guide 
to how to plead a limitations defense sufficiently). 
119  Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (E.D. Pa. 2011); see also, 
e.g., Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) (“The forms appended to the rules 
bolster the Court’s analysis that rule 8(b) does not require defendants to provide factual alle-
gations supporting defenses.”); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 
1051 (D. Minn. 2010) (“[N]othing in the text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or in 
the Appendix of Forms even hints that a defendant must plead sufficient facts to establish the 
‘plausibility’ of an affirmative defense.”). 
Summer 2015] THE FORMS HAD A FUNCTION 1133 
defense, but also facts in support of it.’ ”120 Reading Form 30 in this way has 
been particularly more prominent in light of Twombly and Iqbal, given the 
seeming incongruity (in the view of these courts) of requiring plaintiffs to plead 
more detail than defendants would have to offer in response.121 The debate is 
ongoing, with sound arguments being offered on both sides.122 
Finally, the forms have served various other miscellaneous functions, such 
as illustrating the appropriate contents of a request to waive formal service of 
process,123 emphasizing the need for pleadings to be short and plain rather than 
prolix,124 and buttressing the requirement of formal written consent to the au-
thority of a magistrate judge.125 
IV. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE FORMS 
Notwithstanding this long tradition of invoking the forms at all levels of 
the federal judiciary, there have been two distinct challenges to the forms in the 
past decade. The first is judicial questioning of the Official Forms in the wake 
of Twombly and Iqbal. The second is the impending 2015 abrogation of Rule 
84 and the abolition of the forms altogether. Both of these challenges are dis-
cussed below. 
A. Judicial Questioning of the Forms 
Several courts have pushed back against the forms in light of the tension 
between their admonitions and the seemingly conflicting interpretations of the 
                                                        
120  Hammer v. Peninsula Poultry Equip. Co., No. RDB-12-1139, 2013 WL 97398, at *5 (D. 
Md. Jan. 8, 2013); see also Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No. DKC 11-2416, 
2011 WL 5118325 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (finding that Form 30 does require compliance 
with Twombly). 
121  See, e.g., Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009). (“In this 
case, the Court agrees with the reasoning of the courts applying the heightened pleading 
standard to affirmative defenses. It makes no sense to find that a heightened pleading stand-
ard applies to claims but not to affirmative defenses.”). 
122  See generally Stephen Mayer, Note, An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 275 (2013) (discussing the arguments offered by each side in support of 
its position respecting the applicability of Twiqbal to affirmative defenses). 
123  See, e.g., AIRFX.com v. AirFX LLC, No. CV-11-01064, 2011 WL 5007919, at *5 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 20, 2011): 
Defendant first contends that plaintiffs’ failure to include an expected return date on the waiver 
form constitutes non-compliance. . . . Notably, nowhere in Form 6 is there a place to fill in a re-
quired return date. Plaintiffs’ waiver of service form copied the language of Form 6 exactly. 
Therefore, the absence of a return date on the waiver form did not constitute noncompliance 
with Rule 4(d)(1)(F). 
124  See, e.g., Raiser v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 13-2925 RGK (RZ), 2014 WL 794786, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014) (referring the plaintiff to the Appendix of Forms for an un-
derstanding of what “short and plain” means in pleadings in light of the plaintiff’s excessive-
ly lengthy and uninformative complaint). 
125  Hajek v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (Magistrate con-
sent). 
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Federal Rules from the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.126 This has been 
most pronounced in the patent context.127 In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,128 
Judge Dyk—concurring in part and dissenting in part—challenged the suffi-
ciency of the patent claim form, Form 16 (now Form 18), when he wrote: 
In my view, a bare allegation of literal infringement using the form is inad-
equate to provide sufficient notice to an accused infringer under a theory of lit-
eral infringement. The form fails to state which claims are asserted and which 
features of the accused device are alleged to infringe the limitations of those 
claims. In alleging that the “electric motors embod[y] the patented invention” 
the form fails to recognize that a patent is only infringed when the accused 
product satisfies all of the limitations of the claims. However, I agree that under 
Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we would be required to find 
that a bare allegation of literal infringement in accordance with Form 16 would 
be sufficient under Rule 8 to state a claim. One can only hope that the rulemak-
ing process will eventually result in eliminating the form, or at least in revising it 
to require allegations specifying which claims are infringed, and the features of 
the accused device that correspond to the claim limitations.129 
After Judge Dyk’s opening salvo against the patent form, other courts be-
gan to challenge the sufficiency of Form 18 in various ways. Some dismissed 
the form as not designed for more sophisticated design patents and as outdated, 
having been drafted prior to the Twiqbal decisions.130 More common has been 
the judicial cabining of Form 18 to its strict terms as an exemplar of pleading 
direct infringement claims only, rather than indirect claims, thereby relieving 
those courts of the obligation to treat the form as sufficient.131 Not all courts 
have agreed, thus creating a split on the matter.132 
                                                        
126  See, e.g., McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “Iqbal conflicts with the form complaints approved by the Supreme 
Court and Congress as part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); Fink v. Burlington 
Coat Factory of Florida, LLC, No. 13-62316-CIV, 2014 WL 2158416, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 
23, 2014) (“[A] tension exists between the sparse assertions found in Form 11 and the more 
stringent requirements of Twomby and Iqbal.”). 
127  See, e.g., In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 
1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing continuing vitality of Form 18—the patent form—
after Twombly and Iqbal). 
128  McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
129  Id. at 1360 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
130  See, e.g., Colida v. Nokia, Inc., 347 Fed. App’x 568, 571 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Form 18 
is a sample pleading for patent infringement, but is not tailored to design patents and was last 
updated before the Supreme Court’s Iqbal decision.”). 
131  See, e.g., Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. C-09-01531-RS, 2009 WL 
2972374, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (“Both types of indirect infringement include ad-
ditional elements, none of which Form 18 even purports to address. In the absence of any 
other form that addresses indirect infringement and is made binding on the courts through 
Rule 84, the Court must apply the teachings of Twombly and Iqbal.”); see also, e.g., 
e-LYNXX Corp. v. InnerWorkings, Inc., 2011 WL 3608642 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that 
Form 18 is insufficient for indirect infringement claims); Weyer v. MySpace, Inc., No. 2:10-
cv-00499-MRP-FFMx, 2010 WL 8445305, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) (same); Tech. 
Licensing Corp. v. Technicolor USA, Inc., No. CIV-2:03-1329-WBS-EFB, 2010 WL 
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Outside of the patent infringement claim context, judges have noted the 
seeming incongruity between what Twombly and Iqbal require and the Official 
Forms.133 For example, in Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co., the court 
held a patent invalidity counterclaim to the Twombly standard, noting that 
“[p]ut simply, the forms purporting to illustrate what level of pleading is re-
quired do not reflect the sea change of Twombly and Iqbal.”134 Another ap-
proach has been to limit the forms to the simple types of claims they state, with 
the plausibility standard requiring more facts in the context of more complex 
matters such as those that were at issue in Twombly and Iqbal. This view was 
reflected in Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Illinois: 
“[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case. In a complex 
antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sam-
ple complaints in the civil rules’ Appendix of Forms may be necessary . . . .”135 
The court in Zimmerman v. Paulsen was more direct in making this point: 
Plaintiffs argue that their Complaint is adequate because it comports with 
Form 13 contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Appendix of Forms 
for a “Claim for Debt and to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances Under Rule 
18(b).” The Court finds this argument unpersuasive, however, because Form 13 
is for claims alleging intentional fraud, whereas in Count II Plaintiffs are alleg-
ing constructive fraud.136 
In Memory Control Enterprise, LLC v. Edmunds.com, Inc.,137 the court did 
not attribute the inapplicability of the forms to the complexity of the matter be-
fore it—a patent invalidity claim. Rather, the court simply distinguished be-
tween patent infringement claims—to which an Official Form applied—and 
patent invalidity claims, which lacked a specific, dedicated form: “[W]hile the 
Appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure includes a form for patent 
infringement, it includes no such form for patent invalidity. Until such a form is 
included, defendants must meet the pleading standard the Supreme Court an-
nounced in Twombly and Iqbal.”138 As more courts have given voice to the 
clear tension between the plausibility pleading standard of those cases and the 
                                                                                                                                
4070208, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010) (same); Sharafabadi v. Univ. of Idaho, No. C09-
1043JLR, 2009 WL 4432367, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 27, 2009) (same). 
132  See Bluestone Innovations Tex., L.L.C. v. Formosa Epitaxy Inc., No. 2:10-cv-171-TJW-
CE, 2011 WL 4591906, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2011) (discussing the split regarding the 
appropriate standard for pleading indirect infringement in light of Form 18). 
133  Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1348 (11th Cir. 2010) (Ryskamp, J., 
dissenting) (“Such a pleading [in Form 11] would likely be considered scant under the 
Twombly standard.”). 
134  Tyco Fire Products LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 905 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
135  Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). 
136  Zimmerman v. Paulsen, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080–81 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
137  Memory Control Enter., LLC v. Edmunds.com, Inc., No. CV 11-7658 PA (JCx), 2012 
WL 681765 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012). 
138  Id. at *3. 
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simplicity of the longstanding forms, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee took 
notice, giving it a ground to call for their abolition.139 
B. The Abolition of the Forms 
In 2013, the Committee on Practice and Procedure published for comment 
a proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Official Forms as unnecessary.140 After 
conducting “informal inquiries” that confirmed their “initial impressions,”141 
the Advisory Committee offered at least seven reasons to support its conclusion 
that the forms were no longer necessary: (1) “Lawyers do not much use these 
forms”;142 (2) “there is little indication that they provide meaningful help to pro 
se litigants”;143 (3) “the pleading forms live in tension with recently developing 
approaches to general pleading standards”;144 (4) “the amount of work that 
would be required to assume full responsibility for maintaining the forms”;145 
(5) the fact that “many alternative sources provide excellent forms”;146 (6) “the 
ranges of topics covered by the pleading forms omit many of the categories of 
actions that comprise the bulk of today’s federal docket,”147 and (7) “[t]he pur-
pose of providing illustrations for the rules, although useful when the rules 
were adopted, has been fulfilled.”148 
Although the reasons offered for abolishing the forms are many, none of 
them hold up under scrutiny.149 The last of these reasons just mentioned can be 
dispensed with easily. In light of the numerous cases reviewed above in which 
courts and litigants invoked or relied on the Official Forms as illustrations of 
the proper interpretation or application of a Federal Rule, the illustrative func-
tion of the forms persists. Indeed, the cases reviewed also rebut the notion that 
litigants fail to use the forms; they certainly use them to make arguments about 
                                                        
139  See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes 39–40 (Mar. 22–23, 2012) (“Questions 
about the role of Rule 84 forms arose with the perception that the pleading forms seem in-
consistent with the pleading standards described in the Twombly and Iqbal decisions. . . . 
There is real concern that pleading forms—especially Form 18 for patent infringement cas-
es—do not fit with Twombly and Iqbal. . . . Case law suggests that the pleading forms do not 
suffice under Rule 8, contrary to the statement in Rule 84. No one would think we should 
have Rule 84 if we were starting today. We should disavow it.”). 
140  COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 83, at 275. 
141  Id. at 276. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 329. 
149  Here I respond to arguments raised in favor of abrogation by the Advisory Committee. 
Professor Brooke Coleman, in her piece submitted for this symposium, addresses additional 
arguments against abrogating the forms. See Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The 
Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15 NEV. L.J. 1093, 1103–09 
(2015). 
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the Rules and what they require. To the point that litigants do not use the forms 
as the model for their pleadings, such is not the purpose of the Official Forms. 
As the (now abandoned) “Introductory Statement” announced at the beginning 
of the Official Forms prior to 2007, “The following forms are intended for il-
lustration only. They are limited in number. No attempt is made to furnish a 
manual of forms.”150 Thus, the critique that lawyers and pro se litigants do not 
use the forms—which is untrue151—and that the forms are not comprehensive 
in their coverage are wholly inapt as the forms never purported to be the fill-in-
the-blank variety that a litigant would complete and file verbatim, notwith-
standing their sufficiency. Similarly, the Committee’s argument that other 
sources provide litigants with forms for their use is beside the point, since, 
again, the Official Forms were not meant to be “a manual of forms.” As such, 
the workload that the Committee feared having to undertake should it attempt 
to update and maintain the Official Forms to make them into such a manual is a 
straw man because no such work is necessary. The forms only need to change 
to reflect amendments to the Federal Rules they illustrate. More importantly, 
those alternative sources of forms do not provide forms that will be authorita-
tive vis-à-vis the Federal Rules, thereby failing to make them a sufficient sub-
stitute for the Official Forms the Committee wishes to abandon. 
That said, what of the argument that as interpretations of the Federal Rules 
change, the forms cannot be permitted to remain in tension with such interpre-
tations? Ideally, because the forms themselves are authoritative, interpretations 
plainly inconsistent with them should be prohibited, meaning the tension is re-
solved by voiding the interpretation. However, when the High Court itself is the 
promulgator of the errant interpretation, this ideal collapses. Instead, the op-
tions are to (1) ignore the forms and allow the interpretation to trump (with the 
form serving only as a hortatory reminder of the impropriety of the interpreta-
tion); (2) reinterpret the forms as confined to their specific contexts; (3) amend 
the forms to bring them in conformity with the deviant interpretation; or (4) 
abolish the forms entirely. If it is true that the forms themselves are sufficient 
by command of the Federal Rules themselves, then it is wholly illogical for 
them to become insufficient by the passage of time or through judicial interpre-
tation if the language of the forms is unchanged. Thus, permitting judicial in-
                                                        
150  FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Introductory Statement (2006). 
151  The Committee did not attempt to establish the veracity of this claim empirically but of-
fered it purely as its own ipse dixit. Indeed, courts have referred pro se plaintiffs to the Offi-
cial Forms for guidance in stating their claims. See, e.g., Weymouth v. Ariz. Dept. of Liquor 
Licenses & Control, No. CV-12-979-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 4359073, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 
21, 2012) (“In preparing an amended complaint, the Weymouths [pro se plaintiffs] should 
consult Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and the ‘Appendix of Forms’ referenced therein 
. . . .”); Gharbi v. Flagstar, Nos. A-10-CA-382 LY, A-11-CA-924 LY, 2012 WL 716150, at 
*2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2012) (“For examples of how to write a complaint, Plaintiffs [who 
were proceeding pro se] should review the form complaints available in the Appendix to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Montano v. Medical Dept. of Solano State Prison, No. 
CIV S-07-0800-LKK-EFB-P, 2007 WL 2199044, at * 2 n.4 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2007) (refer-
ring a pro se plaintiff to Form 9 for pleading guidance). 
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Forms—save Forms 5 and 6, which pertain to waiver of service of process.156 
Then, in May 2014 the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure—which is referred to as the Standing Committee—unanimously 
approved the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms.157 The full Judicial 
Conference approved the amendments in September 2014158 and the Supreme 
Court approved them in April 2015.159 Because Congress is unlikely to veto the 
amendments,160 it appears that abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms is a fore-
gone conclusion. 
Such an outcome is lamentable. Absent the forms, there will be little to 
hinder full application of plausibility pleading to the full range of allegations 
found within all complaints, requiring a level of factual detail not supported by 
the forms but purportedly mandated by plausibility. Litigants will have no 
source for challenging this move and courts may lack a foundation for resisting 
urgings to move in such a direction. Finally, in losing Rule 84 and the forms we 
will lose a source that expounds and exemplifies the simplified vision of the 
Federal Rules. Rule 84 unashamedly declares that the vision of the Rules is to 
produce a civil litigation process in the federal courts that is simple, and that 
pleading and other filings should be simple and brief, qualities that facilitate 
litigant access to justice. Abrogating Rule 84 may be symbolic (or symptomat-
ic) of an attempt to depart from that liberal vision in this “fourth era” of civil 
procedure. Let us hope that is not so. 
  
                                                        
156  See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 10 (2014), available at 
http://www.cclfirm.com/files/Report_050914.pdf (“At the April meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules, the Advisory Committee unanimously approved the recommen-
dations of the Duke Subcommittee, the Discovery Subcommittee, and the Rule 84 Subcom-
mittee that certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be adopted.”); see 
also Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes (Apr. 10–11, 2014). 
157  Moore, supra note 4 (“The Standing Committee met on May 29–30, 2014 in D.C. and 
unanimously approved the amendments as they were modified by the Advisory Committee 
at its meeting in April.”). 
158  David Sellers, Judicial Conference Receives Budget Update, Forwards Rules Package to 
Supreme Court, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/09/16 
/judicial-conference-receives-budget-update-forwards-rules-package-supreme-court. 
159  Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (April 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15(update)_1823.pdf. 
160  Congress would have to enact legislation blocking the proposed rule changes, which is 
unlikely given the House of Representatives is controlled by Republicans, who likely would 
support abrogation of the forms. 
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